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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to disambiguate between different notions of
pursuit worthiness regarding scientific inquiries. To this end we propose a
unifying pattern of pursuit worthiness: “It is rational for Y to pursue X
if and only if pursuing X is conducive of the set of goals Z.” By showing
in which ways variables X,Y , and Z can be changed, we present different
notions of pursuit and pursuit worthiness. With respect to variable X,
we distinguish the pursuit of scientific theories, epistemic objects, and
technological developments. With respect to variable Z, we distinguish
between epistemic and practical pursuit worthiness. Finally, with respect
to variable Y , we distinguish between individual and communal pursuit
worthiness. By means of these distinctions we are able to explicate some
of the major ambiguities underlying the concept of pursuit of pursuit
worthiness, as well as to shed light on some confusions in philosophical
literature that have resulted from their neglect.
1 Introduction
In response to Hans Reichenbach’s distinction between the context of discov-
ery and the context of justification (Reichenbach, 1938), the so-called context
of pursuit emerged as the context characterized by a preliminary evaluation of
scientific theories (Laudan, 1977, 1980). This context combines the aspects of
discovery (as the process of theory development) and the aspects of justification
(since the normative question, whether a given scientific idea is worthy of pur-
suit, can be posed in it). In this paper we will primarily focus on the latter of
the two aspects - the question of the pursuit worthiness of scientific inquiries.
A number of authors have identified the idea of pursuit worthiness and em-
phasized its importance for explaining the dynamics of science. For instance,
we can find Richard Tursman speaking of “the logic of pursuit and/or of pre-
liminary evaluation of hypotheses”, linking it to Charles S. Peirce’s account of
abduction as a logic of pursuit (Tursman, 1987, p. 13-14). Imre Lakatos char-
acterizes his “methodology of scientific research programmes” as consisting of
“a negative heuristic”, which tells us what paths of pursuit to avoid, and “a
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positive heuristic”, which tells what paths to pursue (Lakatos, 1978, p. 47).
Ernan McMullin speaks of a “heuristic appraisal”, which regards the research-
potential of a theory (McMullin, 1976). Thomas Nickles also discusses “heuristic
appraisal” (Nickles, 2006), as well as a “preliminary evaluation”, “plausibil-
ity assessment” or “pursuit” as the context which “requires the comparative
evaluation of problem-solving efficiency and promise, not simply the evaluation
of completed research”, in contrast to the traditional theories of confirmation
(Nickles, 1980, p. 21). Martin V. Curd argues that “not only is the logic of pur-
suit of more immediate practical relevance to scientific inquiry than the logic of
probability but also that it is the only workable notion of a logic of discovery
in the sense of a logic of prior assessment that one can formulate” (Curd, 1980,
p. 204).
Moreover, it has been pointed out that the question of pursuit worthiness
of scientific inquiries can be posed not only with respect to the young scientific
theories, but also for those that are already accepted or those that have been
overthrown (Nickles, 2006). Thus, in this broader sense, the evaluative aspect of
the context of pursuit refers to the assessment of pursuit worthiness of scientific
inquiries at various stages of theory development.
But how to characterize the rationality of scientific reasoning underlying this
context? A general way to understand “X is worthy of pursuit” is in terms of
goal-directed rationality, i.e. along the bi-conditional scheme:1
It is rational for Y to pursue X if and only if pursuing X is (suffi-
ciently/most/etc.) conducive of the set of goals Z.
By interpreting each of the variables X,Y, Z in a different way, we can obtain
different notions of pursuit worthiness. First, the unit of evaluation (X) can
be a scientific theory or some other scientifically relevant issue (such as an
epistemic object or a technological development). Second, the goals that a
pursuit should be conducive of (Z) can be defined in various ways. Many of the
philosophers mentioned above have regarded them as epistemic (or cognitive)
goals, and thus treated the evaluation of pursuit worthiness in terms of epistemic
(or cognitive) values. However, more recent discussions of pursuit have taken
the perspective of practically relevant goals, where the evaluation in the context
of pursuit consists of both epistemic and non-epistemic criteria (e.g. (Kitcher,
2001), (Douglas, 2009), (McKaughan, 2008), (Elliott and McKaughan, 2009)).
Finally, we can take the subject for whom the pursuit worthiness is evaluated
1 We are here interpreting what might be considered epistemic rationality (i.e. “it is epis-
temically justified to consider X as worthy of pursuit”) in terms of instrumental rationality
(i.e. “it is justified to pursue X since it helps us in achieving a set of goals Z”) (see (Kelly,
2003)). How these two notions of rationality are co-related in the case of pursuit worthiness
is a discussion that goes beyond the scope of this paper. Then again, according to Wolfgang
Spohn epistemic rationality only concerns “empirical beliefs about how the actual world is”
(Spohn, 2002, p. 252), while evaluations (such as our evaluations concerning the pursuit wor-
thiness of theories) belong to the realm of practical rationality. Spohn also criticized theories
of instrumental rationality in which actions are the primary locus of rationality, whereas he
prefers to focus on intentions instead. Of course, our scheme may readily be reformulated in
view of this objection.
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(Y ) to be an individual scientist, a given scientific community, a certain interest
group, etc.
The aim of this paper is to disambiguate between different notions of pursuit
worthiness regarding scientific inquiries along these lines. This will help us to
shed light on certain confusions in philosophical literature and on some impor-
tant questions regarding scientific rationality that have remained insufficiently
addressed. In Section 2 we will make some preliminary points concerning the
interpretation of our scheme. In Section 3 we will discuss different units of ap-
praisal. We will then in Section 4 address different types of goals and show in
which way –what we shall call– epistemic pursuit worthiness differs from prac-
tical pursuit worthiness, where the former involves only epistemic goals while
the latter involves both epistemic and non-epistemic goals. In Section 5 we will
address the issue of the subject for whom the pursuit worthiness is evaluated
and we will take a closer look at the distinction between –what we shall call–
individual pursuit worthiness and communal pursuit worthiness. Moreover, we
will show some important consequences of this distinction for the discussion on
pluralism, and for the issue of consensus and dissent among scientists. Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 Some Preliminaries Concerning our Scheme
2.1 The evaluator, Y and Z
The evaluator and Y It is important to distinguish between the person who
uses the formula in order to evaluate the pursuit worthiness of some X –let’s
call her the evaluator– and the unit Y in view of which X is evaluated to be
pursuit worthy.
Note further that the evaluator is always a single person while Y may be
a group. Moreover, in case Y is a single person it may not be identical to the
evaluator. In case Y is a group it may not contain the evaluator. A simple
example is the application of the evaluation of pursuit worthiness as part of a
historical rational reconstruction (see e.g. (Sˇesˇelja and Weber, 2012), which dis-
cusses the question whether the theory of continental drift was pursuit worthy,
or (Chang, 2011), which discusses whether phlogiston was pursuit worthy after
the Chemical Revolution).
The set of goals Z, criteria, values, the evaluator and Y Let us now
specify how the set of goals Z relates to the evaluator and Y . First, in case
Z is not part of Y ’s set of goals there is no normative force to a claim of the
following kind: Y should do some action A since doing A is conducive of the
set of goals Z. Hence, the goals in Z have to be successfully ascribable to
Y .2 Second, Z and the associated values and criteria may be independent from
2Of course, one may counter-factually ascribe some goals to Y irrespective of the question
whether Y actually has these goals. However, in this case we do not evaluate the rationality
of Y but rather the one of a counter-factual counterpart of Y .
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the evaluator’s goals, values and criteria: e.g. an ethical constraint to avoid
vivisection may be ascribable by some evaluator to Y although the evaluator
herself doesn’t share this value. Third, the criteria and values used in order
to evaluate the conduciveness of X for Z are either those that the evaluator
considers as apt, respectively best for the evaluation or those that the evaluator
ascribes to Y . For instance, in a historical rational reconstruction we may,
on the one hand, evaluate the pursuit worthiness with criteria and values that
reflect the methodological standards of the respective time period. On the
other hand, we may notice certain epistemic biases present in the values used
by scientists, and hence approach the issue in a more corrective and critical
manner, by introducing standards that we conceive of to be more conducive of
the goals recognized by the scientists at the time.
2.2 Types of evaluation
In this section we will discuss and disambiguate the right side of our bi-conditional
scheme, namely “X is conducive of”.
Comparative reading One way of reading this phrase is in a comparative
manner. Given a set of candidates the evaluator is interested in the theories
that are –individually judged– the comparatively most conducive of Z. One
may think about this type of evaluation in terms of optimizing: the evaluator
seeks the theories that optimize the likelihood of reaching the set of goals Z.
However, it is important to notice that it may sometimes be impossible to order
theories in a linear order of preference according to their pursuit worthiness,
hence there may be various mutually incomparable candidates that are best
and hence judged to be pursuit worthy, while there is not the best one.3 On the
one hand, the reasons for this can be found in the usual suspects forwarded by
the proponents of bounded rationality: the limitations of our cognitive powers,
the limited time we have for our evaluations, etc. On the other hand, when
dealing with evaluations based on multiple criteria –e.g., C1 and C2– we usually
end up quite naturally with partial as opposed to linear orderings. Just suppose
T1 fairs better with respect to C1 than T2 while T2 fairs better with respect to
C2, and suppose further that we do not prefer C1 over C2 nor vice versa. In
this case T1 and T2 are incomparable.
Note further that the optimizing concerns the variable X in our formula as
opposed to Z and the associated criteria and values. The questions: (a) which
criteria are optimal in evaluating the pursuit worthiness of a theory, and (b)
which goals are the intrinsic, essential, or indispensable values of Y (e.g., the
scientific community) are independent from the former and –although being
an appropriate puzzle for the philosopher of science– beyond the scope of this
paper.
3Hence, when we speak of “optimizing” we have a heuristic, respectively bounded notion
in mind rather than the strict and often futile search for the singular optimal candidate.
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One peculiarity for this type of evaluation is that it is not aggregative in the
following sense. It may, for instance, be the case that the evaluator ends up
with theories T1, T2 and T3 that are deemed pursuit worthy for Y (since each of
them is maximally pursuit worthy compared to the other candidates), however
it would not be rational for Y to pursue all 3 candidates. For instance if Y is a
single scientist it may be more efficient for her to focus on one theory, or if Y is
a research centre the given resources may restrict the choice to say two projects.
The latter example motivates another comparative modus of evaluation.
Given our set of candidates the evaluator is now interested in the subset of
candidates that are comparatively most pursuit worthy, judged as a “research
package”. In contrast to the first modus here X need not consist of a single
theory. Note that, similar as above, in some cases it may not be possible to
linearly order the various subsets of candidates according to their respective
pursuit worthiness. We may also think of this type of evaluation in terms of
optimizing: the evaluator now seeks the set of candidates, the pursuit of which
optimizes the likelihood of reaching the set of goals Z.
A small example helps to illustrate our point: Suppose that judged indi-
vidually our evaluator considers T1 and T3 more pursuit worthy than the still
rather promising T2, and T2 more pursuit worthy than the bad candidate T4. It
is not clear which theory, T1 or T3, is comparatively more promising. So from
the point of view of the individual comparative type of evaluation T1 and T3
are most pursuit worthy. Now suppose further that each of our four candidates
individually can be financed by Y , however T3 being the most expensive of all
is such that it would itself consume all the financial resources available to Y ,
while it is possible to financial support the bundle T1 and T2. In this case the
latter subset {T1, T2} is preferred over {T3} and may be indeed the most pursuit
worthy in the second comparative type of evaluations where X is a bundle of
theories.
Non-comparative reading Finally, there is a non-comparative type of eval-
uation. In this case, when we evaluate the pursuit worthiness of theories we
do not compare their overall respective pursuit worthiness in order to decide
whether they are promising candidates. Rather, the evaluation concerns intrin-
sic factors which make it possible to judge the pursuit worthiness of a given
theory irrespective of how other theories perform in terms of pursuit worthi-
ness.4 Of course, this does not mean that the evaluation is entirely ignorant
with respect to other theories. Rather, the explanatory scope, the open ques-
tions and problems of other theories, etc. constitute the cognitive horizon against
which the pursuit worthiness evaluation takes place. More precisely, the cogni-
tive horizon is constituted –among other things– by the current subject domain
of a given discipline, by the problems that scientists tackle, by the anomalies
and difficulties they face, by respected scientific methods, etc. The cognitive
horizon need not be homogeneous: various sub-disciplines may have different
preferences e.g. on what counts as a good scientific method, a good explanation
4See also (Whitt, 1990).
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etc. Moreover, a newly pursued theory may challenge this status quo in some
ways. Many of these points are constituted by other, maybe rivaling theories.
For instance, one of the indices of pursuit worthiness can be formulated as the
question whether the theory is able to offer certain novel explanations or pre-
dictions, that is, to explain or predict phenomena that its rival is not able to.
Hence, we may have to compare certain features of the new theory with those of
its rivals. However, that does not mean we are comparing their overall epistemic
or cognitive promise.
In this type of evaluation the phrase “is conducive of” is interpreted in terms
of constraint satisfaction where the given criteria and values determine a certain
threshold against which the evaluation of X takes place. If X is judged to be
more promising than the threshold, X is deemed to be worthy of pursuit.
Static versus dynamic rationality We sometimes give examples where we
speak of a group or organization (such as a research center) evaluating the pur-
suit worthiness of some X. However, as pointed out above, this rather imprecise
formulation should not distract from the fact that the evaluator is always a sin-
gle person. Typically, many experts in the organization will individually be
evaluators and communicate their results and enter thereby a process of ratio-
nal negotiation about the pursuit worthiness of X, which may in turn make
some experts go through a process of several readjustments of their evalua-
tion. This may take various forms: on the one hand, informed by their peer
experts they may revise some of their evaluations and/or criteria used for the
evaluation and hence adjust the outcome of the evaluation accordingly. On the
other hand, other experts may convince them that some of the goals they have
ascribed to Y are inappropriate and they will adjust them accordingly. This
dialectic deliberation process is also typical in scientific debates concerning the
pursuit worthiness of scientific theories. Sometimes this may lead to consensus
formation, sometimes dissent will ensue.5
Against the background of this discussion it is important to notice that our
notion of rationality is a static one.6 It concerns the question whether it is
rational to pursue X given the best current insights on the basis of the given
goals and criteria. This is different from a dynamic evaluation that concerns
the question whether the evaluator arrived at the present stance in a rational
way. This may for instance lead to a critical rational analysis of the dialectical
deliberation process we discussed in the previous paragraph.
5How a consensus regarding pursuit worthiness may be concretely achieved remains a topic
for future research (see, e.g., (Gilbert, 1987), (Beatty & Moore, 2010)).
6For the distinction between static and dynamic rationality theory see e.g. (Spohn, 2002).
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3 The Pursuit Worthiness of Theories, Epistemic
Objects, and Technological Developments
In this section we will clarify different types of pursuit our discussion is con-
cerned with (variable X). We can distinguish between the pursuit of scientific
theories and other types of pursuit, such as those regarding epistemic objects
or technological developments.7 These types of pursuit are often interwoven or
come in bundles within the same research. For instance, the pursuit of Wegener’s
theory of the continental drift, which was explanatory of different geological ex-
plananda, implied the pursuit of the continental drift as an epistemic object.
Therefore the pursuit worthiness of the theory of continental drift implied that
the continental drift as an epistemic object was worthy of pursuit as well.
As it has often been pointed out, how promising a given theory is, needs
to be assessed by means of a set of criteria that is different from the one used
for assessing theory acceptance ((Laudan, 1977), (Whitt, 1992), (Sˇesˇelja and
Straßer, 201x)).8 Different authors have emphasized different values as indices
of pursuit worthiness, but explanatory and heuristic virtues of the given theory
have often been considered as some of the crucial ones. For instance, the ca-
pability of the theory to offer explanations that its rivals have not managed to
offer so far can be seen as such an indicator. This explanatory virtue is differ-
ent from the one usually required for theory acceptance, where we are not only
interested in what the theory can explain, but also in what it cannot explain,
that is, in its explanatory anomalies. In contrast, when we evaluate whether a
theory is worthy of pursuit, instead of focusing on its explanatory anomalies, we
are rather interested in its programmatic character. That is, we are interested
in the prospective values, which allow for a prospective assessment, rather than
a retrospective one, which is typical for the context of acceptance. (see (Sˇesˇelja
and Straßer, 201x), (Whitt, 1992, p. 621), (Whitt, 1990, p. 472-473)).
In contrast to scientific theories, we can also speak of pursuit worthiness of
epistemic objects. Hasok Chang (following (Rheinberger, 1997)) characterizes
epistemic objects as entities that are identified as constituents of reality, and
which have historicity about them (examples would be oxygen, phlogiston, atom,
etc.). The interesting aspect of the historicity of epistemic objects is that some
of them persist through theoretical changes, while others go extinct. Using the
example of phlogiston, Chang argues that scientists sometimes abandon certain
objects without having good epistemic reasons for that, and that moreover, there
has been an unwarranted and unproductive tendency towards such eliminations
(Chang, 2011, p. 426). In other words, these abandoned epistemic objects were
worthy of pursuit. The question of the pursuit worthiness of epistemic objects
is different from the question of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories also
due to the fact that the former can outlast different theories and conceptual
7This distinction is different though complementary to Martin Carrier’s distinction between
knowledge-driven research and demand-driven research (Carrier, 2010).
8A similar distinction can be made for the acceptance of an epistemic object/a technology
as opposed to the question whether it is pursuit worthy.
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frameworks.
In addition to the above mentioned historical examples of epistemic objects,
a certain statistical correlation can be considered as an epistemic object as well.
For instance, pursuing correlations such as those between smoking and lung
cancer can be worthy in view of certain epistemic and social reasons. However,
once we have shown that (or while we are investigating whether) the correlation
holds, we are also interested in a theory that explains it. Whether such a theory
is worthy of pursuit or not needs to be evaluated in a different way (for instance,
by taking a look at the significance and the quality of those explanations that
the theory offers, how well connected it is with other scientific theories, which
heuristic methods the theory is based on, etc.).
Another example of the pursuit of epistemic objects is the investigation of
the question as to whether there is extra-terrestrial life, as it has been done
by various SETI (the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence) projects. For
this investigation to be worthy of pursuit, we need to show that there is a
methodology that provides the heuristics of the investigation, that there is a
certain level of likelihood of success in finding the extraterrestrial intelligent life
forms, as well as that the overall epistemic and non-epistemic benefits of such
an investigation outweigh the possible dangers (see (Kukla, 2001)).
Yet another type of pursuit that should be distinguished from the pursuit
of explanatory theories is the pursuit of technological developments. Pursuing
the invention of an instrument, apparatus, machine, etc. could be a part of
the pursuit of a certain explanatory theory. For instance, developing nuclear
weapons can be seen as a part of the pursuit of theories within the domain
of nuclear physics, where the former was not only an application of the latter,
but it also served to produce additional evidence for it. Clearly, there are good
reasons why the pursuit of such a technology may be considered highly ethically
problematic and in so far unworthy of being conducted. But this does not mean
that a pursuit of theories in the domain of nuclear physics is unworthy as well,
in case they offer alternative ways of obtaining the evidence regarding their
hypotheses. When we evaluate whether a given technological development is
worthy of pursuit, we are interested in how useful such a technology could be,
how easy it would be to handle it, what the benefits and dangers of such a
pursuit are, etc. In contrast to scientific theories, technological developments
do not need to aim at offering scientific explanations (though they may indeed
make use of scientific explanations, that serve as guidelines in the construction
of the given technology).
To sum up: on the one hand, the pursuit of phenomena, entities, and techno-
logical developments, and on the other hand, the pursuit of explanatory theories
belong to different types of pursuit, which may be tightly connected. Neverthe-
less, evaluating their respective pursuit worthiness may require different criteria
of evaluation.
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4 Epistemic and Practical Notions of Pursuit
Worthiness
In this section we will focus on variable Z, the set of goals that a pursuit should
be conducive of. It is clear that scientific inquiry concerns certain epistemic
or cognitive goals, such as, providing explanations and accurate descriptions
of natural or social phenomena, which should help us to better understand
the world, or generating and consolidating theories “that express empirically
grounded and well confirmed knowledge and understanding of phenomena”
(Lacey, 2009, p. 840).9 However, scientific inquiry as a part of the scientific
practice may concern a broader spectrum of non-epistemic (or non-cognitive)
goals as well, such as ethical, social or political goals. Hence, the pursuit wor-
thiness of scientific theories may be evaluated in terms of epistemic or cognitive
criteria, or in terms of a broader set of criteria that include also other, non-
epistemic or non-cognitive ones.10
Some of the early approaches to the context of pursuit regarded pursuit
worthiness primarily in terms of the former set of goals (e.g. (Laudan, 1977),
(Whitt, 1992)). However, a number of more recent discussions have related the
evaluation of pursuit worthiness to the latter set of goals, that is, to a joint set
of epistemic and non-epistemic criteria.
Practical Pursuit Worthiness We speak about practical pursuit worthiness
where the set of goals Z comprises both epistemic and practical goals. Practical
goals and values enter the picture, for instance, in the context of science policy.
Ethical values may for instance give rise to restrictions on free inquiry:
Respecting rights comes at a price, and it’s important that the price
be distributed fairly. In situations where free inquiry would unfairly
increase the burden on those who are already disadvantaged, there
can be no right to free inquiry. (Kitcher, 2009, p. 103)
Kitcher proposes a detailed account of how a scientific inquiry should be or-
ganized, where the notion of pursuit is understood in terms of both epistemic
and non-epistemic standards (Kitcher, 2001, Chapter 9).11 However, he recog-
nizes a possible conflict between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for pursuit
worthiness.
9 Note that Lacey adds a number of other conditions that are constitutive of his account
of the aim of science.
10 Some authors (e.g. (Laudan, 2004)) make a sharp distinction between the notion of “epis-
temic values” and the notion of “cognitive values”, since they interpret the former as values
that are to be conducive of truth as the main epistemic goal. However, we take the notion
of epistemic value in a less strict sense by leaving the issue of a concrete (set of) epistemic
goal(s) open, that is, whether it is to be specified as truth, empirical adequacy, coherence,
etc. (see also (Lacey, 2004), (Sˇesˇelja and Straßer, 201x)). Hence, for the purposes of this
paper it will suffice to use the terms “epistemic value” and “cognitive value” interchangeably.
11 Another example would be Heather Douglas’ discussion of cognitive and non-cognitive
values that jointly play a role in assessing pursuit worthiness of research processes (Douglas,
2009, Chapter 5).
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Without going into a discussion on Kitcher’s view on free inquiry, there is an
important point about pursuit that Kitcher raises here. The conflicting interests
regarding pursuit can be presented in terms of different prices that need to be
payed if the pursuit is conducted. For instance, if the research involves a certain
ethically problematic methodology, we may say that the ethical price to pay is
too high, and hence, the pursuit in this form should be avoided. Similarly, we
may ask whether the epistemic price to pay is too high if a certain pursuit (that
is, a scientific project involving it) is no longer financed. The epistemic price
could, for instance, refer to the abandoning of this research altogether, or to
giving up on certain aspects of it, which would, if realized, result in an epistemic
benefit. Those arguing for the rejection of further financial support may say that
the economic price to pay outweighs the epistemic benefit in case the theory is
pursued (for example, due to the fact that the theory is epistemically not very
interesting, while its pursuit requires a huge investment). Of course, how one
weighs and compares different “prices to be paid” is also dependent on social
and political interests that determine what means that some factors outweigh
the others, which can vary from one community to another. Hence, in some
contexts non-epistemic criteria could outweigh the epistemic ones.
Epistemic Pursuit Worthiness The epistemic pursuit worthiness concerns
the case in which Z is restricted to epistemic goals.
This, in general, does not mean that the values used in this assessment have
no pragmatic elements. For instance, in order for a theory to be pursuit wor-
thy we may request that it is, in principle, technically realizable. Technical
realizability is a criterion that obviously has a pragmatic aspect to it. This
criterion concerns the feasibility of a research and its methodological require-
ments in view of the current technological achievements, and it is directly linked
to the heuristics or programmatic character of the given research. It concerns
the question as to whether the heuristics of the theory allows for further evi-
dence to be collected and used to support the given hypotheses or to confront
them with possible anomalies. Nevertheless, it is epistemic in character since
it is conducive of the epistemic goals of scientific investigation (for example, its
problem-solving efficiency). More precisely, unless the research is technically
realizable, it cannot have a proper heuristics, which is one of the key epistemic
requirements in the evaluation of pursuit worthiness (see, for example, (Whitt,
1992), (Sˇesˇelja and Straßer, 201x)). These practical considerations that come
with the heuristic appraisal of theories have been discussed by Thomas Nickels.
The heuristic appraisal “evaluates the promise or potential fertility and feasibil-
ity of further work on a problem, research program, theory, hypothesis, model,
or technique” (Nickles, 2006, p. 159) where “external factors” such as “whether
[. . . ] research is likely to be funded, whether the lab director or department
head will look favourably upon this project; whether enough laboratory space,
equipment, and expert technical assistance is available” (p. 169) has to be taken
into account. What distinguishes these practical considerations e.g. from the
moral values discussed in the context of practical pursuit worthiness, is that
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they are in function of epistemic goals.
However, there are certain cases in which it is useful to suspend with cer-
tain practical considerations concerning the theory heuristics. Let us give two
examples.
First, suppose some funding organization is interested in the pursuit worthi-
ness of a theory for some research group Y in order to decide whether it wants to
fund the research. Of course, the very decision whether the practical constraints
of the theory heuristics are fulfilled depends on the funding and hence on the
outcome of the evaluation itself. In this sense it would be circular or nonsensical
to use as a criterion for the evaluation the likelihood of its funding by this or-
ganization. Rather, the funding organization is interested in questions, such as,
whether the heuristics is promising under the counter-factual assumption that
they would fund it.
Second, often it is interesting to abstract away from certain trends in research
policy and funding. For instance, there may be a pragmatic turn in research
policy which makes e.g. a fundamental research in cosmology or projects such
as the above mentioned SETI program less likely of being funded. One may
want to evaluate its pursuit worthiness by counter-factually suspending this
practical constraint. A research program may have a promising programmatic
character (e.g., from a strictly methodological point of view) irrespective of
the contingent external fact that its subject matter is currently not favored by
funding organizations. Again, the evaluation takes place in a counter-factual
manner.
Of course, there are certain factual considerations for which it would be
nonsensical to counter-factually suspend them. This concerns, for instance,
technical requirements in the heuristics of a given theory (such as computa-
tional power, experimental technology, etc.) that are (principally speaking) not
available or the construction of which is impossible. However, where we draw
the borderline is dependent on the specific context in which we evaluate the
pursuit worthiness of inquiries.
It is also worth mentioning that non-epistemic considerations may function
as factors in view of which the epistemic values are applied in case of epistemic
pursuit worthiness. For example, if we want to assess whether a theory has ex-
hibited a certain growth, which would help us in judging whether it has remained
worthy of pursuit, we will have to take into account the number and the exper-
tise of scientists working on the theory or the appropriate funding that allows
for the required resources. That does not mean that the epistemic evaluation is
not epistemic in character (we are still evaluating the epistemic growth of the
theory). It just means that our expectations regarding the epistemic standards
are in this sense context dependent. In other words, the non-epistemic factors
determine in which respects the conditions for fulfilling the epistemic standards
have been met, and what thus can be expected from the given theory.12
12 We can here adapt Hugh Lacey’s point on the interplay of cognitive and social values
regarding theory acceptance (Lacey, 2005) to the context of pursuit: non-epistemic values
form conditions under which epistemic appraisal (in the context of pursuit) occurs, though
they are not constitutive of such an appraisal.
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The significance of the distinction between epistemic and practical
pursuit worthiness Altogether, the main significance of distinguishing epis-
temic from practical pursuit worthiness is that it allows us to focus on the
epistemic properties of an inquiry.13 On the one hand, this is important for
the evaluation of certain episodes from the history of science and the rational-
ity underlying views of scientists with regard to the pursuit of certain theories.
For example, if the pursuit of a theory was rejected due to some epistemic rea-
sons, we will be interested in assessing whether such reasons were legitimate or
whether the theory was, in fact, epistemically worthy of pursuit. On the other
hand, the epistemic approach may help us in clarifying the reasons why a certain
pursuit is favored or rejected. For instance, it could be found out that a pursuit
of a certain theory is supported because of certain political reasons (and thus
considered as practically worthy of pursuit in the second sense that we have ex-
plicated) in spite of being epistemically not very attractive. Similarly, a theory
may be practically not worthy of pursuit while being epistemically worthy of
pursuit. In this case we may want to focus on the suboptimal practical aspects
of the theory. If for instance its experimental methods are ethically questionable
we may want to revise and improve on the heuristics in view of these aspects
(by e.g. investigating the question as to whether computational models can be
used for similar purposes).
Finally, note that if the practical pursuit worthiness is to be epistemically
responsible, epistemic pursuit worthiness is a necessary (though not a sufficient)
condition for the practical one.
5 Individual and Communal Pursuit Worthiness
5.1 Individual and communal pursuit worthiness as a re-
search directive and an evaluative stance
Finally, let us take a look at our third variable (Y), referring to the subject for
whom the pursuit worthiness is evaluated. As we have mentioned in Section
1, this could be an individual scientist or a group of scientists (representing a
certain scientific community). In view of this, we can distinguish between two
types of pursuit worthiness. On the one hand, saying that a theory is worthy of
pursuit for a given scientific community means that it is in the (epistemic and/or
practical) interest of the given scientific community to pursue it. We will here
focus on a particular meaning of the scientific community - namely, as referring
to a group of scientists who are working in the given scientific domain.14 On
13It is important to notice though that in some types of inquiries, such as those within the
field of applied science and technology it may not always be possible to make this distinction,
since the values may be essentially interwoven. For instance, what counts as a “successful”
development of a given technology may depend on certain social and ethical constraints (see
e.g. (Lacey, 2009)).
14Indeed, the notion of communal pursuit worthiness depends on which type of scientific
community we have in mind, that is, whether we are talking about a small research centre or
a larger group of scientists.
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the other hand, we can speak of pursuit worthiness that refers to the (epistemic
and/or practical) interests of an individual scientist. We will call the former
communal pursuit worthiness, and the latter individual pursuit worthiness.
First of all, let us notice that even though an individual scientist belonging
to a given scientific community usually upholds the communal cognitive and
non-cognitive goals, she may sometimes have some additional personal goals as
well (e.g. advancement in her career, financial goals, ethical goals etc.). This
may not only influence the way in which she puts the weighting on certain
communal goals, but it may sometimes even lead to a conflict between her own
goals and those of the community. For instance, the ethical goals of a scientist
may conflict with the idea of vivisection, otherwise common for the community,
which finds it conducive of certain epistemic goals. In this case, the scientist
may challenge this approach of the community, in spite of being its member. As
a result, her individual assessment of pursuit worthiness may have a different
result from the communal one.
Similarly, in the case of epistemic pursuit worthiness, an individual scientist
may place specific preferences on values that he considers to be epistemically
relevant for his research goals. Hence, a theory that is epistemically individually
worthy of pursuit for one scientist may not be so for another, while it is usually
worthy of pursuit in the communal sense.
In this section we would like to point out two ways in which the individual
and communal pursuit worthiness are used, which are especially significant for
the scientific practice. More precisely, each of these two notions can be used to
make a specific type of claim. On the one hand, individual pursuit worthiness
can be given in the form of a research directive. On the other hand, communal
pursuit worthiness can be given in the form of an evaluative stance. Let us take
a closer look at each of these types of claims.
A claim of pursuit worthiness as a research directive gives an answer to
the question: “Which theory should Y pursue?” or “Should Y pursue this
theory?”. The assessment of pursuit worthiness here takes into account the
concrete research context of Y , and as a result, the set of goals (our variable Z)
will usually include epistemic and non-epistemic goals. In other words, a claim
of pursuit worthiness as a research directive usually falls under the practical
pursuit worthiness. For instance, in case Y is an individual scientist, we can
speak of individual pursuit worthiness as a research directive. Note that in this
type of assessment idiosyncratic factors may play a role too, as Kuhn already
emphasized (Kuhn, 1977, p. 320-339).
However, if we take Y to be a scientific community in a broad sense, that
is, as consisting of scientists in the given domain in general, communal pursuit
worthiness may shift more towards the claim of an evaluative stance. Since
Y is in this case usually not specified by any concrete practical context, the
main concern of such an evaluation will be the question: “Would pursuing this
theory be in the epistemic interest of science, that is, the respective scientific
domain?”. Moreover, ideally, idiosyncratic values will not play a role in this
type of evaluation. This can easily be clarified by means of an example of
a rational reconstruction of a case from the history of geology. When Alfred
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Wegener proposed the theory of continental drift in 1910s-1920s, a number of
earth scientists found this theory not only unacceptable, but not even worthy
of pursuit (see (Sˇesˇelja and Weber, 2012)). Now, on the one hand, it could be
asked whether Wegener and each of his followers had good reasons for pursuing
the theory of drift. In this case, we may take a look at their arguments based on
epistemic values, but also at their personal preferences, interests, motivations.
Hence, we are interested in the assessment of pursuit worthiness as a research
directive. On the other hand, we may ask whether the epistemic reasons in
terms of which Wegener and his followers argued that their theory was worthy
of pursuit were epistemically warranted. In this latter case, we are interested in
the communal pursuit worthiness as an evaluative stance. In other words, we
are not interested in idiosyncratic reasons that motivated scientists to pursue
the theory, but rather in the question, whether the theory was epistemically
attractive for those domains of earth science for which this theory was relevant,
and in this sense, for the geological community at the time.
One of the cognitive goals of the scientific community taken in this broad
sense may be robustness of the scientific knowledge constituting the respective
domain. In virtue of this goal, it is conducive for the scientific community to
pursue a plurality of inquiries in order to assure (as much as that is possible)
that the domain remains robust. Due to the necessary epistemic uncertainty
regarding any (dominant) theory, the domain can remain robust by allowing
for different back-up theories to be simultaneously developed (see (Sˇesˇelja and
Straßer, 201x)).
A diversity of pursued paths within a scientific community is also of direct
relevance for the value of pluralism in scientific theory and practice (e.g. Kitcher,
1993, 2002; Longino 2002, Chang 2004, 2011; Kellert and Longino 2006). For
this purpose, claims of communal pursuit worthiness as evaluative stances are
especially important, since they allow scientists to assess inquiries as worthy of
pursuit that are not directly related to their own research. Furthermore, this
type of evaluation may often be done in terms of epistemic values alone, at least
in cases in which ethical, social and other non-epistemic values are not a subject
of a controversy. An important aspect of the communal pursuit worthiness as
an evaluative stance is that a scientist working in one paradigm may evaluate a
theory from another paradigm as worthy of pursuit without necessarily conclud-
ing that she herself should engage in its pursuit. For instance, this is important
for scientific debates in which a scientist evaluates not only her own research
path, but also those of other scientists, and engages in a rational discussion on
their pursuit worthiness. She may not only be interested in the question what
she is to pursue, but also, how cognitively or epistemically attractive other ri-
valing inquiries are. Moreover, by means of this type of assessment she may
receive critical feedback from other scientists about her own research and its
pursuit worthiness. Indeed, there is no a priori reason why a scientist pursuing
one theory would not be able to evaluate the communal pursuit worthiness of
the rivaling theory.15
15 Even in view of Kuhnian incommensurability (see (Kuhn, 1962)), such an evaluative
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5.2 Communal pursuit worthiness and the value of plu-
ralism
As we have mentioned above, the notion of communal epistemic pursuit worthi-
ness in the form of an evaluative stance is especially important for the pluralism
of pursued theories. It is also important for answering questions about the epis-
temic basis of a given pursuit, such as whether a pursuit of a certain theory
is/was epistemically warranted, independently of the interests and motivations
of individual scientists who actually pursue/d it. Even if no scientist pursues
a given theory from some point on, we may still ask whether this theory has
certain epistemic merits that make it sufficiently promising to be further inves-
tigated.16
Failing to recognize the distinctions between the individual and the commu-
nal pursuit worthiness in the sense indicated above can lead to certain ambi-
guities. For instance, when Nickles writes: “Deciding that a defective theory
or model is worthy of further pursuit amounts to launching or continuing a
research program” (Nickles, 2006, p. 168) – we can agree with this statement
only if we understand it as a research directive. In case the claim of pursuit
worthiness was given as an evaluative stance, it would not amount to launching
or continuing the inquiry, since it entails no concrete practical commitments
regarding it.
An important consequence of the fact that more than one theory may at the
community level be simultaneously evaluated as worthy of pursuit is that we do
not necessarily need a dissent among scientists regarding the pursuit worthiness
of theories in order to have a diversity in the context of pursuit. Scientists may
agree that different theories are worthy of pursuit in the given domain and yet,
each of them may engage in a pursuit of only one of them.
Surprisingly, this quite obvious point has been overseen by a number of
authors who have discussed theory choice, especially with regard to scientific
controversies. In order to have the diversity of theories that are actively pursued,
they have often pointed out a disagreement among scientists as crucial for this
purpose. We will take a look at two such examples.
Our first example is Thomas Kuhn’s emphasis on dissent in scientific prac-
tice:
Before the group accepts it, a new theory has been tested over
time by the research of a number of men, some working within it,
others within its traditional rival. Such a mode of development,
however, requires a decision process which permits rational men to
disagree, and such disagreement would be barred by the shared algo-
rithm which philosophers generally have sought. If it were at hand,
all conforming scientists would make the same decision at the same
stance is possible by means of the process of persuasion, translation and interpretation expli-
cated by Kuhn (see Sˇesˇelja and Straßer, 201xa).
16 For an example of how this notion can be applied to a concrete case study, see (Sˇesˇelja
and Weber, 2012).
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time. With standards of acceptance set too low, they would move
from one attractive global viewpoint to another, never giving tradi-
tional theory an opportunity to supply equivalent attractions. With
standards set higher, no one satisfying the criterion of rationality
would be inclined to try out the new theory, to articulate it in ways
which showed its fruitfulness or displayed its accuracy and scope. I
doubt that science would survive the change. ((Kuhn, 1977, p. 332);
italics added)
Kuhn here tells us that in view of the individual pursuit worthiness, different
scientists may find different theories more worthy of pursuit than others, and
hence, each of them may decide to engage in a pursuit of another one. Note that
the idea of pursuit worthiness here appears as a research directive. In order to
assure a diversity of pursued theories, Kuhn argues that we need to allow for a
disagreement among scientists regarding their research paths.
What Kuhn here overlooks is the notion of communal pursuit worthiness as
an evaluative stance. It is clear that the pursuit of different paths by scientists
leads to scientific pluralism. However, what deserves some more discussion is
the claim that this is essential to pluralism.17 First of all, it is not clear where
the disagreement really lies in case the subject matter concerns the individual
pursuit worthiness of theories as a research directive. There is no disagreement
between the conclusion of a scientist A: ”I should pursue theory T1” and the
conclusion of a scientist B: “I should pursue theory T2”. Rather, a disagreement
would only concern a more general claim regarding the pursuit worthiness of a
theory that is not relativized to one’s own research activity.
However, making a claim of communal pursuit worthiness as an evaluative
stance does not require a “shared algorithm” which delivers as an output a
unique theory that is worthy of pursuit. In contrary, both (some) new candidates
as well as the traditional rival could simultaneously be assessed as worthy of
pursuit. Scientists may still have different preferences concerning the question
which theories they find most worthy to work on. This way a discipline may
be characterized by the plurality of pursued theories without any disagreement
being necessary for it. Hence, Kuhn’s dilemma from the previous quote can
be avoided. Of course, there may still be a disagreement about the pursuit
worthiness of some candidates. However, this disagreement seems not anymore
essential to pluralism.18
Our second example is from (Rueger, 1996), which shows a similar neglect of
this point. With regard to the pursuit of scientific theories, Alexander Rueger
writes:
[. . . ] suppose that we had a generally followed set of rules for
17 Also, according to Paul Hoyningen-Huene’s reading of Kuhn “This disagreement is vital
for the distribution of risk in a situation of epistemic uncertainty as no one knows, which
candidate for paradigmatic theory will be successful.” (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006, p. 128).
18 In (Sˇesˇelja and Straßer, 201xa) the above presented problem of pluralism in Kuhn’s work
is further explicated by pointing to Kuhn’s epistemic semantic monism (see also (Chang,
2011)).
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rational pursuit. Then all rational scientists, or at least almost all,
would make the same decision concerning the choice of a theory
to work on. This would destroy an essential condition for progress
within scientific community. [. . . ]
If each member of the community would follow the rule for pur-
suit, there would just be one preferred theory for the whole group to
work on. Rational behavior of this sort could not produce the diver-
sity of research that seems important to scientific progress. (Rueger,
1996, p. 265)
What Rueger here neglects is that “a generally followed set of rules for ratio-
nal pursuit” may be construed as the communal pursuit worthiness. In contrast,
the decisions that scientists make concerning the choice of a theory to work on
refers to claims of individual pursuit worthiness as a research directive. How-
ever, the communal pursuit worthiness (especially in the form of an evaluative
stance) does not amount to an assessment which necessarily gives one unique
preferred theory.
In view of these two examples19 we can conclude that a neglect of a very
simple thought – that more than one theory can be evaluated as worthy of
pursuit at the same time – can lead to unfounded ideas regarding the rationality
of scientific reasoning in the context of pursuit.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented some of the crucial aspects of rationality under-
lying the context of theory pursuit. By proposing a unifying pattern of pursuit
worthiness: “It is rational for Y to pursue X if and only if X is conducive of the
set of goals Z.”, we have indicated in which way different notions of pursuit and
pursuit worthiness can be distinguished. First we have distinguished different
units of appraisal in the context of pursuit (variable X), which allow for a more
precise disambiguation of the idea of pursuit worthiness. In this regard, we have
distinguished between the pursuit of scientific theories, epistemic objects and
technological developments. Next, we have distinguished between the epistemic
and the practical pursuit worthiness (with regard to variable Z), and between
the communal and the individual pursuit worthiness (with regard to variable
Y ). We have shown that overlooking these distinctions can lead to unwarranted
conclusions regarding the rationality of scientific reasoning in the context of
pursuit.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank Maarten van Dyck, Erik Weber,
Jan De Winter and two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on a former
version of this paper.
19 A similar point could also be made for Richard E. Grandy’s argument for diversity of
pursuit (see (Grandy, 2000)).
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